De kennis van de "werkelijkheid", die zich achter den dichten nevel van veelzinnige woorden verbergt, is op het gebied der massa-psychologie wel heel moeilijk toegankelijk. Dit blijkt duidelijk uit de heerschende theorieën, inzonderheid de pessimistische theorieën van de laatste halve eeuw, over den zoogenaamd noodlottigen invloed van het saamhoorigheidsgevoel op het oordeel van de, in zulk een gevoel vereenigde, menschen. De meeste der opvattingen, die thans over de mogelijkheden en de onontbeerlijkheid der politieke propaganda worden verkondigd, passen in hetzelfde kader (...) van onklare, overdreven angstvoorstellingen betreffende de verstandelijke tekortkomingen van den mensch in de massa. Het nuchtere onderzoek, dat op de vaststelling van verifieerbare feiten is gericht, dient zich te hoeden voor de vele fouten, die vooral op het gebied der massa-psychologie plegen te worden gemaakt. Het dient zich voornamelijk bewust te zijn, dat het gevaar eener ongegronde veralgemeening hier bijzonder groot is. We zien "dè massa" niet, zelfs niet, wanneer we menschenmenigten vóór ons zien. We willen immers doordringen tot de onzichtbare gevoelens, waarvan we niet kunnen weten, in hoeverre en in welken graad ze zich van de menschen, die we zien, hebben meester gemaakt! Inderdaad zijn we dan ook niet in staat, de "massa" psychologisch te onderzoeken, maar wel afzonderlijke individuen, zij het dan ook vele individuen. Daarbij komt nog, dat de in dit verband voor de geestelijke processen gebezigde woorden zoo vaag onmogelijk zijn. We kennen bij voorbeeld zeer weinig nauwkeurige bijzonderheden, wanneer we de "meening" van een mensch "vaststellen". Want de "meening" is ook voor den enkelen mensch een min of meer vaag begrip. En voor de "openbare meening" geldt dit in het bijzonder. Voorzichtig te werk gaande, kunnen we evenwel voldoende en betrouwbare waarnemings-resultaten op dit terrein te bereiken, wanneer we door den woordnevel heendringen. Zulke resultaten worden bij voorbeeld verkregen door de waarneming van het gedrag van krantenlezers in verband met pogingen tot beïnvloeding der meening door censuur, door misleiding en andere "propaganda"-middelen. Het gedrag der krantenlezers schijnt ons veelal vol tegenstrijdigheid, maar geeft den deskundige toch een bruikbaar en scherp-omlijnd beeld van onbewuste neigingen en behoeften. Overschat wordt in den regel het aantal menschen, dat tot blinde daden van zoogenaamde massahartstocht wordt opgezweept. Het nuchtere onderzoek van de feiten toont aan, dat de meerderheid slechts de rol van radelooze en hulpelooze toeschouwster speelt, een toeschouwster, die in den grond der zaak vreedzaam en verdraagzaam is. Het gedrag der meerderheid wordt in zulke gevallen bepaald door dwang en intimidatie. De problemen der massa-psychologie, die nog niet zijn onderzocht, liggen dan ook hoofdzakelijk op dit gebied. Voornamelijk dient de werking van dwang en intimidatie -- de "moreele" en de gewelddadige intimidatie -- te worden onderzocht en haar invloed op de achteraf gevormde meening der meerderheden, die zich in radelooze gelatenheid in hun lot hebben geschikt. De door gewelddadige minderheden uitgeoefende dwang en intimidatie zijn altijd en overal de oorzaken van de ontstellende ontaardingsverschijnselen van het saamhoorigheidsgevoel, die op rekening van de "massa" worden gesteld. (shrink)

The central conflicts of the world today are closely related to cultural, traditional, and religious differences between nations. As we move to a globalized world, these differences often become magnified, entrenched, and the cause of bloody conflict. Growing out of a conference of distinguished scholars from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, this volume is a singular contribution to mutual understanding and cooperative efforts on behalf of peace. The term paideia, drawn from Greek philosophy, has to do with (...) responsible education for citizenship as a necessary precondition for effective democracy. (shrink)

Dieser Band ist der erste Teil einer Lekture von Hegels Phanomenologie des Geistes, in dem die ersten drei Hauptkapitel - d.h. -Bewusstsein-, -Selbstbewusstsein- und -Vernunft- - von Hegels erstem Hauptwerk umfassend kommentiert werden. Der Text entstand dabei wahrend eines uber viele Jahre laufenden Seminars, welches am Institut fur Philosophie der Universitat Wien unter Leitung von Professor Dr. Friedrich Grimmlinger abgehalten wurde und in dem der Hegelsche Text gemeinsam Satz fur Satz gelesen und ausgelegt wurde.".

The Descartes Dictionary is an accessible guide to the world of the seventeenth-century philosopher René Descartes. Meticulously researched and extensively cross-referenced, this unique book covers all his major works, ideas and influences, and provides a firm grounding in the central themes of Descartes' thought. The introduction provides a biographical sketch, a brief account of Descartes' philosophical works, and a summary of the current state of Cartesian studies, discussing trends in research over the past four decades. The A-Z entries include clear (...) definitions of the key terms used in Descartes' writings and detailed synopses of his works. Also included are entries noting philosophical influences, of both figures that influenced Descartes and those that he in turn influenced. For anyone reading or studying Descartes, rationalism, or modern philosophy more generally, this original resource provides a wealth of useful information, analysis, and criticism. Including clear explanations of often complex terminology, The Descartes Dictionary covers everything that is essential to a sound understanding of Descartes' philosophy. (shrink)

Despite the recent backlash against epistemic consequentialism, an explicit systematic alternative has yet to emerge. This paper articulates and defends a novel alternative, Epistemic Kantianism, which rests on a requirement of respect for the truth. §1 tackles some preliminaries concerning the proper formulation of the epistemic consequentialism / non-consequentialism divide, explains where Epistemic Kantianism falls in the dialectical landscape, and shows how it can capture what seems attractive about epistemic consequentialism while yielding predictions that are harder for the latter to (...) secure in a principled way. §2 presents Epistemic Kantianism. §3 argues that it is uniquely poised to satisfy the desiderata set out in §1 on an ideal theory of epistemic justification. §4 gives three further arguments, suggesting that it (i) best explains the objective normative significance of the subject's perspective in epistemology, (ii) follows from the kind of axiology needed to solve the swamping problem together with modest assumptions about the relation between the evaluative and the deontic, and (iii) illuminates certain asymmetries in epistemic value and obligation. §5 takes stock and reassesses the score in the debate. (shrink)

This paper considers the place of reasons in the metaphysics of epistemic normativity and defends a middle ground between two popular extremes in the literature. Against members of the ‘reasons first’ movement, we argue that reasons are not the sole fundamental constituents of epistemic normativity. We suggest instead that the virtue-theoretic property of competence is the key building block. To support this approach, we note that reasons must be possessed to play a role in the analysis of central epistemically normative (...) properties, and argue that the relation of possession must be analyzed in terms of competence. But while we diverge with reasons-firsters on this score, we also distance ourselves from those who deny reasons any important role in epistemology. For we maintain that possessed reasons do help to ground deontic facts in the epistemic domain (e.g., facts about what one epistemically ought to believe, may believe, or is justified in believing). Indeed, we present an argument that the possession of sufficient epistemic reasons is necessary and sufficient for propositional justification, and that proper basing on such reasons yields doxastic justification. But since possession and proper basing are themselves grounded in competence, reasons are not the end of the explanatory road: competence enables them to do their work, putting them—and us—in the middle. (shrink)

Rationality requires us to respond to apparent normative reasons. Given the independence of appearance and reality, why think that apparent normative reasons necessarily provide real normative reasons? And if they do not, why think that mistakes of rationality are necessarily real mistakes? This paper gives a novel answer to these questions. I argue first that in the moral domain, there are objective duties of respect that we violate whenever we do what appears to violate our first-order duties. The existence of (...) these duties of respect, I argue, ensures that apparent moral reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. I then extend these arguments to the domain of overall reason. Just as there are objective duties of respect for moral reasons that explain moral blameworthiness, so there are objective duties of respect for reasons that explain blameworthiness in the court of overall reason. The existence of these duties ensures that apparent reasons are exceptions to the independence of appearance and reality. (shrink)

A classical work on Gestalt psychology from a member of the "Berlin School." Discusses perception in relation to the environment, along with action, learning, memory, and socieity.

Categorization and memory for specific items are fundamental processes that allow us to apply knowledge to novel stimuli. This study directly compares categorization and memory using delay match to category (DMC) and delay match to sample (DMS) tasks. In DMC participants view and categorize a stimulus, maintain the category across a delay, and at the probe phase view another stimulus and indicate whether it is in the same category or not. In DMS, a standard item working memory task, participants encode (...) and maintain a specific individual item, and at probe decide if the stimulus is an exact match or not. Constrained Principal Components Analysis was used to identify and compare activity within neural networks associated with these tasks, and we relate these networks to those that have been identified with resting state-fMRI. We found that two frontoparietal networks of particular interest. The first network included regions associated with the dorsal attention network and frontoparietal salience network; this network showed patterns of activity consistent with a role in rapid orienting to and processing of complex stimuli. The second uniquely involved regions of the frontoparietal central executive network; this network responded more slowly following each stimulus and showed a pattern of activity consistent with a general role in role in decision-making across tasks. Additional components were identified that were associated with visual, somatomotor and default mode networks. (shrink)

s. A: KIuPKB entwickelte in einer einheitIichen Systematik vollstlindige Interpretationen fiir viele Systeme der Modalitatenlogik, die vorber nur syn­ taktisch fixiert waren. Hiermit ergab sich auf dem Wege tiber eine quantoren­ logische Erweiterung des Modalitatensystems S4 zugleich eine Semantik fUr die intuitionistische Priidikatenlogik:. Der vorliegende Ergebnisbericht behandelt im Rahmen der klassischen Priidikatenlogik: zwei Modalitatensysteme, deren aussagenlogische Teile mit den Systemen M von v. WRIGHT und S4 von LEWIS tibereinstimmen. Es gibt verschiedene Moglichkeiten, aussagenlogische Modalitatensysteme quantoren­ logisch zu erweitem. Die hier (...) gewiihlten Erweiterungen sind in einer nabe­ liegenden Weise so vorgenommen, daB die Barcan-Formel (Seite 7) ungiiltig, aber ihre Umkehrung giiltig ist. Fiir die Kripke-Semantik dieser Systeme wird im m. Kapitel ein Voll­ stlindigkeitsbeweis nach den Methoden von KIuPKE [13] durchgefiihrt. Bin einfacherer Vollstiindigkeitsbeweis, der aber wesentIich weniger konstruktiv ist, wird in § 4 in Verallgemeinerung der Methode von HENKIN [7] gegeben. Durch eine Binbettung der intuitionistischen Priidikatenlogik: in das quan­ torenlogische Modalitatensystem S4' flihrt die Semantik des Systems S4' zur Kripke-Semantik der intuitionistischen Priidikatenlogik. Diese Semantik wird im V. Kapitel systematisch behandelt und im VI. Kapitel (iihnlich wie in KIuPKB [J3D mit der Semantik von BETH in Beziehung gebracht. (shrink)

We argue for a novel view of suspending judgment properly--i.e., suspending judgment in an ex post justified way. In so doing we argue for a Kantian virtue-theoretic view of epistemic normativity and against teleological virtue-theoretic accounts.

Kurt Flaschs Buch ist die Summe seiner über sechzig Jahre langen Beschäftigung mit Meister Eckhart und seiner Zeit.

A systematic critique of the notion that natural science is the sovereign domain of truth, Critique of Scientific Reason uses an extensive and detailed investigation of physics—and in particular of Einstein's theory of relativity—to argue that the positivistic notion of rationality is not only wrongheaded but false. Kurt Hübner contends that positivism ignores both the historical dimension of science and the basic structures common to scientific theory, myth, and so-called subjective symbolic systems. Moreover, Hübner argues, positivism has led in (...) our time to a widespread disillusionment with science and technology. (shrink)

Internalism holds that epistemic justification is determined by what is internal to the mind, not by facts about the mind-independent world. This paper introduces and defends a new kind of internalism that is rooted in rationalist ideas that have been neglected in recent epistemology, despite inspiring internalist projects in cognitive science. Ignoring rationalist insights has, I argue, damaged the prospects for internalism, by needlessly saddling internalists with empiricist burdens. Internalists can refuse these burdens by accepting a better philosophy of mind. (...) Rather than looking to 17th century rationalists, I look to Kant, and especially his idea that normativity is grounded in the constitution of agency and mind. A Kantian approach can avoid stock objections to internalism, I argue, and can also capture all the alleged benefits of externalism. The paper is structured as follows. In §2, I get back to basics and consider more ways to satisfy the core internalist template than have become standard. I draw attention to rationalist insights about how normativity could be grounded in the constitution of mind, and hypothesize that if internalism respects these insights, some problems disappear. I develop this hypothesis in §3 with a Kantian view. I further defend this view in §4. I conclude in §5 by explaining why Kantian internalism answers the latest challenges to internalism. (shrink)

Ogni tentativo di ripensare le nostre categorie politiche deve muovere dalla consapevolezza che della distinzione classica fra zoé e bios, tra vita naturale ed esistenza politica (o tra l'uomo come semplice vivente e l'uomo come soggetto politico), non ne sappiamo piú nulla. Nel diritto romano arcaico homo sacer era un uomo che chiunque poteva uccidere senza commettere omicidio e che non doveva però essere messo a morte nelle forme prescritte dal rito. È la vita uccidibile e insacrificabile dell' 'uomo sacro' (...) a fornire qui la chiave per una rilettura critica della nostra tradizione politica. Quando la vita diventa la posta in gioco della politica e questa si trasforma in biopolitica, tutte le categorie fondamentali della nostra riflessione, dai diritti dell'uomo alla democrazia alla cittadinanza, entrano in un processo di svuotamento e di dislocazione il cui risultato sta oggi davanti ai nostri occhi. Seguendo il filo del rapporto costitutivo fra nuda vita e potere sovrano, da Aristotele ad Auschwitz, dall'Habeas corpus alle Dichiarazioni dei diritti, il libro di Agamben cerca di decifrare gli enigmi - prima di tutti il fascismo e il nazismo - che il nostro secolo ha proposto alla ragione storica. Fino a vedere, nel campo di concentramento, il paradigma biopolitico nascosto della modernità in cui città e casa sono diventate indiscernibili e la possibilità di distinguere tra il nostro corpo biologico e il nostro corpo politico ci è stata tolta una volta per tutte. (shrink)

Tomus 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie.

Kurt Godel was the most outstanding logician of the twentieth century, famous for his work on the completeness of logic, the incompleteness of number theory, and the consistency of the axiom of choice and the continuum hypothesis. He is also noted for his work on constructivity, the decision problem, and the foundations of computation theory, as well as for the strong individuality of his writings on the philosophy of mathematics. Less well-known is his discovery of unusual cosmological models for (...) Einstein's equations, permitting "time-travel" into the past. This second volume of a comprehensive edition of Godel's works collects together all his publications from 1938 to 1974. Together with Volume I (Publications 1929-1936), it makes available for the first time in a single source all of his previously published work. Continuing the format established in the earlier volume, the present text includes introductory notes that provide extensive explanatory and historical commentary on each of the papers, a facing English translation of the one German original, and a complete bibliography. Succeeding volumes are to contain unpublished manuscripts, lectures, correspondence, and extracts from the notebooks. Collected Works is designed to be accessible and useful to as wide an audience as possible without sacrificing scientific or historical accuracy. The only complete edition available in English, it will be an essential part of the working library of professionals and students in logic, mathematics, philosophy, history of science, and computer science. These volumes will also interest scientists and all others who wish to be acquainted with one of the great minds of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Summary The rhetorical uses of discovery and invention stories are legion, but of particular concern in this paper are those that are deployed for economic or commercial reasons, especially in claiming intellectual property rights, usually in the form of patents. The case of stories about Dr Irving Langmuir (1881–1957) of the General Electric Research Laboratory, who won the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1932 and was the first industry-based laureate from the United States, is examined. Langmuir won the prize for (...) his ‘outstanding discoveries and inventions within the field of surface chemistry’, which also happened to underlie the virtual monopoly that General Electric gained in the supply of electric light. Langmuir was the inspiration for the stereotypically absent-minded and disinterested character of Dr Felix Hoenikker in Kurt Vonnegut's novel, Cat's Cradle (1963). My case study focuses on this and other representations of Langmuir as a discoverer, especially those generated by the General Electric Company, and explores the utility of these representations for Langmuir himself, and for his employer, in corporate PR, in ongoing struggles over patents, and in the post-war organisation of R&D. It is argued that, while the era of corporate research produced new collective modes of discovery and invention their description in heroic, individualistic terms long continued, and for good reason. (shrink)

Many meta-ethicists have thought that rationality requires us to heed apparent normative reasons, not objective normative reasons. But what are apparent reasons? There are two kinds of standard answers. On de dicto views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when it appears to S that R is an objective reason to \ . On de re views, R is an apparent reason for S to \ when R’s truth would constitute an objective reason for S to \ (...) , and it appears to S that R. De re views are currently more popular because they avoid overintellectualizing rationality. But they face problems owing to the way in which they do so. Some assume that we can escape these problems by requiring more information to be apparent or by appealing to defeat. But these strategies fail. So, I defend a new view: apparent reasons are apparent facts that agents are competently attracted to treat like objective reasons, where competence is indirectly defined in terms of objective reasons and a competence/performance distinction is honored. Since one can treat X like an F without having the concept of an F, the view does not overintellectualize rationality. But it is also strong enough to dodge the pitfalls of de re views. (shrink)